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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PART ONE:
Was it reversible error for the trial court to
refuse to admit evidence that the defendant driver fled the
scene of an automobile/pedestrian accident in which he was
involved?
PART TWO°:
Did
refusing

to

the

trial

allow

into

court

abuse

evidence

the

its

discretion

plaintiff's

opinion testimony as to the cause of the accident?
was

this

error

cured

by

the

later

admission

by

expert
If so,

of

this

testimony?

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
PART ONE:
Utah Rules of Evidence, 103, 401, 402 and 403,
will determine the outcome of PART ONE of this appeal.

Due

to the length of these provisions, the text of each is set
out at Appendix A of this brief.
PART TWO:
Utah Rules of Evidence, 702, 703, 704 and 705 will
determine the outcome of PART TWO of this appeal.

Due to

the length of these provisions, the text of each is set out
at Appendix B of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The appellant, Joshua Fisher, (hereafter Fisher),
was injured

in an auto-pedestrian

City, Utah.

The defendant, Warren Trapp (hereafter Trapp) ,

was the driver of the vehicle.

accident in Salt Lake

The case was tried before a

jury.
Fisher was unable to testify on his own behalf
about the accident.
happened.

His injuries blocked his memory of what

(Record at 303.)
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Trapp.

The court denied plaintiff's timely motion for a new trial.
(Record at 242.)

2

PART ONE:

POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
RELATING TO POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
During an JLn camera hearing prior to trial, Trapp
admitted he was a hit-and-run driver.
admitted leaving the accident scene.

Specifically, Trapp

He eventually returned

to the accident site and spoke to a police officer.

Trapp

still did not identify himself as the driver of the car.
Only later did Trapp telephone the police and admit that he
hit Fisher.

(Record at 270.)

Trapp made a motion iji limine to exclude evidence
that he was a hit-and-run driver.
trial court granted Trappfs motion.

(Record at 271.)

The

The basis of the ruling

was that possible prejudice outweighed the probative value
of the particular evidence.

(Record at 27 3.)

No evidence of the hit-and-run was introduced at
trial.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Trapp.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Evidence of flight from the scene of an accident
may be an admission of guilt and should have been admitted.

3

PART ONE: POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
POINT I
EVIDENCE OF POST ACCIDENT
FLIGHT IS PROBATIVE
From early on, Courts have consistently held that
evidence of a defendant driver leaving the scene should be
admitted.

State v. Ford, 146 A. 828 (Conn. 1929); Vuillentot

v. August J. Calverie & Co., 125 So. 168 (La. 1929); Greenewood v. Bailey, 184 So. 285 (Ala. 1938); Shaddy v. Daley, 76
P.2d 279 (Id. 1938); Hallman v. Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498 (So.
Car.

1941); Petroleum Carrier Corporation v. Snyder, 161

F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1947) (applying Georgia law); Brooks v.
E.J. Willey Truck Transportation Co., 255 P.2d

801 (Cal.

1953); Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1962);
Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D. So. Car. 1963); Busbee
v. Quassier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1965); Gaul v. Noiva, 230
A.2d 591 (Conn. 591); Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231
A.2d 558; Richards v. Office Products, 380 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio
App. 1977); Johnson v. Austin, 280 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1979);
Waycott v. Northeast Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Me. 1983).
Evidence of post accident flight is probative for
three separate reasons.

First, the failure to stop evi-

dences a defendant's consciousness of responsibility.

See,

e.g.,

Co.,

Brooks

v.

E.J.

Willey

Truck

Transportation

supra.; Grzys v. Connecticut Co., 123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259
(1938); Shaddy v. Daley, supra.; Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13
La. App. 272, 127 So. 764 (1930).
4

Thus, leaving the scene

PART ONE: POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
of the accident constitutes an admission by conduct.

See,

e.g. , Jones v. Strelecki, supra.; Gaul v. Noivaf supra.;
Harrington

v.

Sharff,

supra.;

Shaddy

v.

Daley, supra.;

Greenewood v. Bailey, supra.; Vuillemot v. August J. Calverie & Co., supra.
Secondly, flight from the scene raises an inference of failing to keep a proper lookout.

An observant

driver should have known that he struck something and would
have stopped.

Jones v. Strelecki, supra.; Busbee v. Quas-

sier, supra.; Vuillemot v. August J. Calverie & Co., supra.
Finally, post-accident failure to stop evidences a
willful, wanton, or reckless state of mind existing at the
time of impact.

e.g., Richards v. Office Products Co.,

supra.; Dean v. Cole, supra.? Hallman v. Cushman, supra.
These inferences would have been valuable to the
jury in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and in
determining the outcome of this case.

POINT II
ANY POSSIBLE PREJUDICE
WOULD NOT BE UNFAIR
Evidence of post accident
unfairly prejudicial.

flight would

not be

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only

if it has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional
one."

(Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 403.)
5

PART ONE: POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
It has been stated that, "unfair prejudice as used
in Rule 4 03 is not to be equated with testimony simply
adverse to the opposing party.

Virtually all evidence is

prejudicial or it isn't material.
unfair."

The prejudice must be

Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc.y 561 F.2d 613, 618

(5th Cir. 1977) .

Although the hit-and-run evidence may be

adverse to Trapp's case, it would not be unfair under
Rule 403.

POINT III
THE PROBATIVE VALUE IS NOT
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED
Evidence of flight from the scene of an accident
is highly probative.

See, Point I, above.

The Utah Rules

of Evidence generally favor admissibility of all relevant
evidence.

Rules 401 and 402.
However, before evidence is admitted, the court

must weigh

the probative value

prejudice."
substantially

Whatever
outweigh

evidence is excluded.
102, 104-05
F.2d

"unfair
the

against possible

prejudice" may

probative

Rule 403.

value

"unfair

arise

must

before

the

Roshan v. Fard, 705 F.2d

(4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Moore, 732

983, 989-92

(D.C. Cir. 1984).

Any doubt should be

resolved in favor of admitting the evidence.

See Lilly,

Evidence, §13 at 34. Where the probative value of proferred

6

PART ONE; POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
evidence is significant, it is error to exclude it despite
possible

prejudicial

effect.

Roshan,

supra.; Bowden

v.

McKenna, 600 F.2d 282 (1st Cir., 1979).
The weight of authority clearly allows for the
admission of the evidence of flight.

No "unfair prejudice"

would arise.

Therefore, it was an

See, Point II, above.

abuse of discretion to fail to admit the evidence of flight.

POINT IV
FISHER'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS WERE AFFECTED
Fisher's substantial rights were denied when the
trial court refused to admit the evidence of Mr. Trapp's
hit-and-run.
First, without the hit-and-run evidence, Fisher
was denied effective ammunition to challenge Trapp's testimony.

Fisher

could

not use

the

inference

of guilt to

impeach Trapp's testimony that he was paying attention to
the road.

(Record at 298-99.)

Nor could Fisher rely on the

inference to show Trapp's consciousness of responsibility
for failing to see Fisher in front of him.

(Record at 298.)

See generally, 5 Am.Jur. 2d, "Appeal and Error", §802,
n.9, 11.

7

PART TWO; POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
Second, Fisher was denied the opportunity to fully
and fairly cross-examine the defense witnesses.

Due to the

order jLn limine, Fisher could not question either the police
investigator or the defense expert as to whether they were
aware of the hit-and-run.
had considered
opinions.

Fisher could not ask whether they

the evidence of flight in reaching their

This denial of full cross-examination was error

effecting Fisher's substantial right.

See generally,

5 Am.Jur. 2df "Appeal and Error", §783 n.l and §809.
Third, Fisher was not allowed to fully explore the
opinion of his expert Val Shupe during the critical initial
phases of trial.

Mr. Shupe made an offer of proof that, in

his opinion, Trapp was not keeping a proper lookout and was
travelling too fast for existing conditions.
334.)

Fisher

was

not

allowed

to

present

(Record at
this

evidence at that time due to lack of foundation.
338.)

opinion

(Record at

Mr. Shupe was not allowed to rely on the inference of

guilt arising from the hit-and-run.

Had Mr. Shupe been able

to rely on that inference, the trial court could not have
questioned

the

adequacy

opinion was based.

of the

foundation

on which

his

Evidence of the hit-and-run testimony

would also have lent credibility to Shupe's testimony when
he was finally allowed to give his opinion on cause.
Point VII herein.)

8

(See

PART ONE: POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
Finally, Fisher could not use the hit-and-run evidence to rehabilitate the testimony of his brother, Patrick.
Patrickfs testimony indicated that Trapp failed to see
Fisher.

(Record

at

310.)

Trapp

attempted

Patrick by laying the blame on Fisher.

to

impeach

(Record at 312-20*)

Fisher was prejudicially denied his opportunity at rehabilitation of Patrick because he could not bring up the
hit-and-run.

See

generally,

5 Am.Jur.

2d,

"Appeal

and

Error", §783 n.l.

CONCLUSION

The evidence

of

flight

from the

scene of the

accident is relevant under the standard provided in Rule
401.

All relevant evidence is admissible under Rule 402.

The trial court found the evidence inadmissible under Rule
403.

However, the Court abused its discretion by failing to

properly weigh the probative value of the evidence against
its

possible

unfair

prejudice

to

the

defendant.

The

plaintiff's substantial rights were affected by not being
allowed full cross examination and by not being able to rely
on

the

influence

of

consciousness

reinforce his witnesses testimony.

of

responsibility

to

Therefore, this Court

should allow Fisher to present the hit-and-run evidence at a
new trial.
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PART TWO; EXCLUSION OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO
THE EXCLUSION OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
Plaintiff called and certified Val Shupe (hereafter Shupe) as an accident reconstruction expert.
320-21.)

(Record at

The defense raised no objection to Mr. Shupe1s

qualifications.

However, the defense objected when plain-

tiff attempted to present Shupe's opinion as to the cause of
the accident.

(Record at 328.)

Shupe!s opinion was that

Trapp1s inattention and excessive speed caused the accident.
(Record at 334.)
insufficient

Defense counsel argued that there was

foundation

on which

to

base

that

opinion.

(Record at 328-33.)
Out of the hearing of the jury, plaintiff's expert
recited the basis of his opinion:

inspection, measurements

and photographs of the accident scene, average running speed
of a nine-year old child, and review of all pleadings,
depositions and police reports of the case.

(3^d.)

The

Court agreed with defense counsel and excluded the expert
opinion evidence on grounds of lack of foundation.
at

334

and

338.)

However, the Court

allowed

(Record
Shupe to

testify as to how far back Trapp was from the point of
impact when Fisher began crossing the road.
338.)

10

(Record at

PART TWO: EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Later

on

in the

trial, the Court

allowed

the

defense expert to state his opinion as to the cause of the
accident.

The defense expert based his opinion on the same

foundation that the plaintiff's expert had offered.
at 393.)

(Record

Ultimately, the plaintiff's expert was allowed to

state his opinion, but only in rebuttal, and only after
supplemental foundation testimony.

(Record at 427.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Failure of the trial court to receive plaintiff's
expert opinion during plaintiff's case in chief was prejudicial error.

The error was not cured by later introduction

of the opinion evidence.

POINT V
ADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR SHUPE'S
TESTIMONY EXISTED FROM THE BEGINNING
The Utah Rules of Evidence permits an expert to
give

his

opinion

on

an

ultimate

issue

"without

disclosure of the underlying facts or date."
Evidence, 705.

prior

Utah Rule of

When a judge requires some foundation, Rule

703 defines what is required.

Under Rule 703, the test to

be applied is whether the materials the expert relies on
"are of a type reasonably

relied on by experts

particular field in forming opinions or inferences.
11

in the

PART TWO; EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The materials Shupe relied on were unquestionably
"of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular
field."

As discussed in the "Fact" section, Shupe visited

the accident site, measured it, read the depositions, read
pleadings, reviewed the police report, took pictures, and
conducted his own tests.

(Record at 321-23, 326, 331,

339-41.)
The defense expert relied on the same information
to reach his opinion.

(Record at 381-93.)

POINT VI
WEAKNESSES IN THE FACTUAL
UNDERPINNINGS GO TO WEIGHT, NOT ADMISSIBILITY
As long as the information the expert relies on is
of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the "particular
field," the weakness in factual underpinnings go to weight
rather than admissibility.

Breider v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

722 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1983); American National Bank
and Trust Co. v. K-Mart Corp., 717 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir.
1983); Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d

1168, 1173

(Utah 1980) . Weaknesses in the factual underpinnings can be
explored on cross-examination.
F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976).

12

Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529

PART TWO; EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Defendant argued the expert testimony was inadmissible

for

two

reasons:

First,

that

plaintiff's

expert

seemed unaware of cars traveling in the opposite direction.
(Record at 330.)

Second, that plaintiff's expert did not

know how far plaintiff was from the edge of the pavement
when plaintiff began to cross.

(Record at 326.)

The defense did not claim that plaintiff's expert
was relying on information that was not usually relied on by
accident reconstruction experts.

The defense only argued

that the information was somehow flawed.
Courts consistently
objections
exactly

that the

facts

allow expert testimony over

relied

like those which existed

on may

not have been

in the case at issue.

Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418f 427 (5th Cir.
1985); Martell v. Boardwalk Enterprises, Inc., 748 F.2d 740,
746-47 (2nd Cir. 1984); Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209, 212
(10th Cir. 1981).

In Kelsay v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 744

F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1985), the court affirmed the admission
of a relatively inexperienced police officer's opinion over
objections that he did not make exact measurements.
Kelsay case is precisely on point.

13

The

PART TWO: EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
POINT VII
THE INITIAL EXCLUSION OF
SHUPE'S OPINION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
It was manifest error to exclude the plaintiff1s
initial presentation of Shupe's opinion.

In Edwards v. Di-

dericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979) f this court recognized
the importance of an expert's opinion on an ultimate issue.
The court noted that "exclusion of an opinion as to an
ultimate issue invites misunderstanding, confusion in the
juror's minds."

(Id., at 1330.)

Such exclusion requires the

jury "to speculate as to what conclusion or conclusions the
technical facts logically support" and otherwise deprives
the jury of valuable information.
An

expert's

highly relevant.
by

manifest

opinion

(Id.)

on

the

ultimate

issue

is

When highly relevant evidence is excluded

error, prejudicial

error

occurs.

Neels, 583 F.2d 337, 346 (7th Cir. 1978).

Davis

v.

Erroneous exclu-

sion of an expert's opinion on an ultimate issue requires
reversal.

See, e.g., Garrett v. Desa Industries, Inc., 705

F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1983); Breider v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
supra; American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago
v. K-Mart Corp., supra; In Re Air Crash in Bale, Indonesia,
684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).

14

PART TWO; EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The defense may argue that the later admission
cured the error.

However, the prejudicial effect may have

even been compounded by the later admission of the opinion.
The plaintiff carries the burden of proof.

He is granted

the first chance to prove his case to the jury.

Fisher did

not get his "first shot" when Shupe's opinion was wrongfully
found inadmissible.
The

problem

only

got

worse

from

there.

The

defense expert was then allowed to give his opinion as to
the ultimate cause of the accident.

As in Edwards, supray

the jury may have become confused

and may have thought

plaintiff's expert initially agreed with the defense expert.
In an attempt to supply further foundation for his
opinion, plaintiff's
Patrick.

expert

returned

to

the

scene

with

When called on rebuttal, Patrick testified that he

remembered the location of Trapp's car as Fisher started
into the street.
This

information

changed

a few facts on which

Shupe originally relied in reaching his opinion.

However,

it did not change that opinion, it reinforced it.

The jury

did not know this.

They may have assumed that Mr. Shupe's

opinion was based exclusively on the "convenient memory" of
Patrick.

This would significantly taint the opinion of Mr.

Shupe.

15

PART TWO: EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Although subsequent admission of evidence may cure
the prior error, that is not the case where the testimony
admitted is not as broad or comprehensive as that excluded.
5A C.J.S., "Appeal and Error", §1753, n. 79.
Malnati, 265 A.2d 394 (N.J. 1970).
cured where

the evidence

Johnson v.

Nor is the initial error

is subsequently

admitted

under

circumstances where it would likely be ignored, Brown v.
Newby, 47 P.2d 1076) (Cal. App. 1935), or where the initial
exclusion weakened its value.
837

Gerbig v. Gerbig, 168 P. 2d

(Mont. 1946); Daggett v. Wolff, 44 S.W.2d 1063 (Tex.

1931).

whether

The

basic

"there

is

standard
a

for

reasonable

judging

likelihood

prejudice
that

is

a more

favorable result would have been obtained by the complaining
party in the absence of error."

Harris v. Utah Transit

Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 222-23. (Utah 1983).

That test is

clearly met in this case.

CONCLUSION

The Court's initial exclusion of Shupefs opinion
was prejudicial error.

Under the circumstances of the case,

the initial exclusion was tantamount to total exclusion.
The subsequently admitted opinion was given under circumstances where it would likely have been ignored.

16

The

PART TWO: EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
opinion was not as broad or comprehensive as it would have
been had it been admitted during the critical initial phase
of trial.

Thus, under the circumstances, the initial error

was not cured by the later admission of the testimony.

A

reasonable likelihood exists that a more favorable result
would have occurred had the opinion been initially admitted.
The case should be remanded for a new trial.

DATED this 2*2 da Y

of

0^\^A^\Q€*!"""

' 1986.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys/fdr Appellant
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APPENDIX A
RULE 103
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected, and
(1) Objection, In case the ruling
is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection
or
motion
to
strike
appears of record, stating
the
specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof.
In case the
ruling is one excluding evidence,
the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or
was
apparent
from
the
context
within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling.
The
court may add any other or further statement which
shows the character of the evidence, the form in
which it was offered, the objection made, and the
ruling thereon.
It may direct the making of an
offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury.
In jury cases,
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent
practicable,
so
as
to
prevent
inadmissible
evidence from being suggested to the jury by any
means, such as making statements or offers of
proof or asking questions in the hearing of the
jury.

Al

(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights although they were not brought
to the attention of the court,
RULE 401
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant
evidence"
means
evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
RULE 40 2
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY
ADMISSIBLE: IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the
State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this State.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
RULE 40 3
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
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APPENDIX B
RULE 70 2
TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
RULE 703
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
The facts or data in the particular
case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
RULE 704
OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
RULE 705
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR
DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION
The expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any
event be requried to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross-examination.
Bl

